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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH
CAROLINA STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
Constitutional Law
During the period under review the Supreme Court of North Carolina
displayed great concern over the impact of federal laws and decisions upon
state law. Most of the litigation dealt with procedural rights and the
effect of such decisions as Miranda and Gideon. Perhaps the most important motivating factor in the period under survey was the court's desire
to find independent state grounds for giving effect to federal policies.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

The power of a municipality to regulate certain businesses under its
police power came before the North Carolina Supreme Court in Cheek v.
City of Charlotte.1 The Charlotte City Council had passed an ordinance
prohibiting certain businesses-massage parlors, health salons, and similar
establishments-from allowing the massage of any person by the opposite
sex. In passing this ordinance, the Council failed to include many businesses which were similarly situated to those regulated, such as the
YMCA, the YWCA, and licensed barber and beauty shops. The court
held that this ordinance arbitrarily discriminated among businesses in
2
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Relying on its decision in State v. Glidden Co.,8 the court noted that
there may be "class legislation" so long as the classification is based on a
reasonable distinction and the law is made to apply uniformly to all members of the class affected.4 The attempt to distinguish businesses in the
Charlotte ordinance failed to provide a "reasonable distinction," for it
was based solely on the opinion of the members of the City Council that
the exempted businesses were not carrying on the activities that the orlinance sought to eliminate. 5
Although the court invalidated this particular ordinance, it indicated
that it would sustain future class legislation ordinances that met the Glidden requirements of (1) a reasonable distinction in the classification and
1273

2

N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968).

Id. at 299, 160 S.E.2d at 23. See Ex Parte Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133
P.2d 64 (1943); J. STRONG, N.C. INDEX 2D, Constitution Law § 20 (1967).
3228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948).
'273 N.C. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 299, 160 S.E.2d at 23.
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(2) uniformity of application." Implied approval was given to an or7
dinance such as the one sustained in Pattersonv. City of Dallas. That
ordinance exempted chiropractors, registered physical therapists, and registered nurses operating under the direction of a physician from the prohibition of massage by the opposite sex.8 The obvious "reasonable distinction" was that the exempt occupations treated illness by means of
massage. Implied approval was also given to an ordinance placing licensing power in the hands of the mayor and requiring all businesses offering
massages to be licensed, so long as the mayor did not arbitrarily deny any
license.' Clearly the court's implied approval of the Patterson statute is
a sufficient guide to the passage of future ordinances."'
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

The power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes only... N.C. CONST. art.

5, § 3
In 1967 the General Assembly passed the Industrial Development Financing Act," authorizing the formation of a state agency to acquire
industrial sites and to construct and equip facilities for private industries.
Projects were to be financed through low interest bearing industrial bonds,
and the sites could be acquired through eminent domain. Completed
facilities would be leased to private industry at a rent sufficient to pay the
bond interest. Concurrently, the legislature passed a resolution' 2 stating
'Id. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 23.
18 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
Id. at 839.
273 N.C. at 298, 160 S.E.2d at 22. See People ex tel. Anderson v. City of
Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 187, 37 N.E.2d 929 (1941).
10 On October 14, 1968, the Charlotte City Council adopted an ordinance similar
to that upheld in the Patterson case. The ordinance provides in § 6-55 (a) that:
it shall be unlawful for any person holding a license under this article to
treat a person of the opposite sex, except upon the signed order of a licensed
physician, osteopath, chiropractor, or registered physical therapist ....

The

requirements of this section shall not apply to treatments given in the residence of a patient, the office of a licensed physician, osteopath or registered
physical therapist, chiropractor, or in a regularly established and licensed
hospital or sanitarium.
Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 50, Oct. 14, 1968. Unlike the ordinance in Patterson,
Charlotte's ordinance is based on the place of medical treatment rather than the
medical qualifications of the person administering the massage. Consequently, masseurs without medical training may administer massages to the opposite sex so long
as they do so in the proper place. This broad basis for exemption does not eliminate
all the abuses that created the need for regulation, but it does not appear to be an
arbitrary, and thus invalid, exercise of the police power.
11

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 123A-1 to -27 (Supp. 1967).

" N.C. GEN.

ASSEmBLY,

Resolution 52, May 19, 1967.
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that the Assembly was reluctantly forced to pass this act to enable North
Carolina to compete for new industry with other states that had passed
such acts. The resolution requested the President and the other 49 states
to take action to eliminate the tax rule making interest on such bonds
exempt from the federal income tax. A subsequent amendment to the
Internal Revenue Code substantially restricted this exemption."
In Mitchell v. North CarolinaIndustrialDevelopment Financing Authority,"4 the North Carolina Supreme Court held the Industrial Development Financing Act to be in violation of the North Carolina Constitution.
Declining to follow the clear weight of authority in this country, the court
returned to its traditional concept of public purpose, which had been temporarily abandoned in State Highway Commission v. Thornton. The
majority rule, which the court rejected, is that "public purpose" must be
defined in terms of "substantial benefits" flowing to the public.1 Mitchell
reemphasized that when governmental activity directly benefits a private
individual or group, but only incidentally or prospectively benefits the
public at large, then it is not for a "public purpose" in the constitutional
sense.
Prior to Mitchell, in its decision in Thornton, the court had shifted towards the "substantial benefits" test. There the court reasoned that a road
serving only a private trucking terminal employing 700 employees was a
public road for which the state could condemn land, despite the fact that
the road ended at the terminal. Justice Sharp, who wrote the majority
opinion in Mitchell, had dissented in Thornton, arguing that even though
the majority purported to follow previous North Carolina cases setting
forth the concepts of "public purpose," it was, in reality, a radical departure from precedent. Emphasizing State Highway Commission v. Batts,'7
which denied the authority of the state to appropriate a landowner's property when the right-of-way for the proposed road would end on another's
land and be used for only one family, Justice Sharp argued that "the dif8
ference... is one of degree only; the principle is the same."1
Perhaps the expressed views of the legislature influenced the court's
18 See INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 103 (c), as amended 1968, which now does not
treat industrial development bonds as within the area of the obligations of a state or
political subdivision thereof, except in certain specific exceptions, and thus no longer
allows the interest on such bonds to be excluded from gross income for federal income tax purposes.
1,273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968).
15271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967), noted in Note, Real Property-Eninent
Domain--The Public Use Requirement, 46 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1968).
10273 N.C. at 248, 159 S.E.2d at 752.
17265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965).
28271 N.C. at 246, 156 S.E.2d at 262.

19691

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

decision, though it appears from the opinion that the major motivating
influence was a fear of widespread expropriation for private benefit. In
any event, the decision emphasizes North Carolina's continued adherence
to a narrow definition of "public purpose."' 9
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The concept of free speech, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, has been held to embrace many different types of communication. Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a claim
20
of immunity under this expanded concept. In State v. Wiggins, the
defendants were convicted under a little-used statute for interrupting and
disturbing a public school."' The defendants, apparently dissatisfied with
the administration of their local high school, silently picketed in protest
just off school grounds. The evidence disclosed that the march did in fact
cause disruption within the school.
Appealing their conviction, the defendants argued that because the
words "interrupt" and "disturb" are ambiguous and not defined in the
statute, the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The court held this contention to be without merit and ruled that since the words are to be given
22
their plain and ordinary meaning, the statute is not void for vagueness.
Appellants' main contention was that they had an immunity under both
the North Carolina and federal constitutions because the purpose of the
march was to convey an idea to someone. Answering this contention, the
court pointed out that under the North Carolina Constitution freedom of
speech is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable restraints of time and
place to protect valid state interests. The court, relying heavily on Cox
v. Louisiana,4 then noted that the freedom was subject to the same restrictions under federal policy, for "the right of peaceful protest does not
"0This definition has been established through a long line of cases. E.g., City of
Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946) ; Reed v. State Hwy. & Pub.
Works Comm'n, 209 N.C. 648, 184 S.E. 513 (1936). In returning to the narrow

definition, the court does not upset such decisions as North Carolina State Ports
Auth. v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 416, 88 S.E.2d 109 (1955)
(power to develop port facilities); Hudson v. City of Greensboro, 185 N.C. 502,
117 S.E. 629 (1923) (establish terminal facilities for public carriers); or Wells
v. Housing Auth., 213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938) (clear slums and maintain
urban redevelopment programs).
00272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
"N.C. GEN-N. STAT. § 14-273 (1953).
272 N.C. at 153, 158 S.E.2d at 42. Accord, State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148
S.E.2d 275 (1966), discussed in Pollitt & Strong, Constitutional Law, Survey of
North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 855, 881 (1967).
272 N.C. at 157-58, 158 S.E.2d at 45.
='379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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mean that everyone with opinions to express may do so at any time and
any place."

25

In affirming these convictions, the court's interpretation of the North
Carolina Constitution appears to be consistent with past decisionsY0 Similarly, the application of the federal constitution is in accord with the most
recent federal cases and is without doubt a reasonable interpretation.
"There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest and
a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all valid
laws and regulations.""
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

Adequate State Grounds
How far must a state go in seeing that a defendant, who is asserting
a constitutional right, is not denied a hearing on the merits of his contention? This issue has been litigated numerous times and the rule seems to
be that the defendant must be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
assert the right and to support that assertion by evidence. 2
The issue was recently raised in three cases in North Carolina. In
State v. Belk,2 9 defendant was indicted for illegal possession and sale of
marijuana. Before pleading, a motion was made to quash the indictment
on the ground that Negroes had been systematically excluded from the
grand jury, thus denying defendant due process and equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment. The motion was denied and the evidence of
discrimination refused. After pleading not guilty, defendant was convicted and an appeal filed. Thereafter, the trial judge offered to hear
evidence on the motion to quash. Defense counsel was unprepared and
the judge granted a two and one-half week period for preparation. At the
later hearing, counsel was again unprepared to support his motion, contending that the judge now had no authority to quash the indictment since
the appeal entries had already been made by the court. The state offered
evidence at the hearing showing that in fact two Negroes served on the
grand jury in question.
In affirming the conviction, the supreme court held that defendant was
entitled to present evidence in support of his motion to quash before he
2r, Id.

at 574.

':E.g., State v. Guthrie, 265 N.C. 659, 144 S.E.2d 891 (1965).

' State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 160, 158 S.E.2d 37, 47 (1967), quoting from
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
"8 E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963).
2D272 N.C. 517, 158 S.E.2d 335 (1968).
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was required to plead to the bill of indictment." While it is true that the
motion was improvidently denied, the trial court did have the power during the same term, though not after the expiration of the term, to later
hear and rule on the motion. Thus, there was no error since the defendant
had ample opportunity to give evidence in support of his motion."'
The Belk decision is in line with the most recent federal decisions.
Although Arnold v. North Carolina32 held that it was a denial of equal
protection systematically to exclude Negroes from grand juries, the issue
here involves Fay v. Noia 3 and the question of whether there are adequate
state grounds to deny a defendant certain constitutional rights. Noia has
been generally interpreted as requiring that the defendant be given a reasonable opportunity to support an asserted right, and no doubt this requirement was met here. The court noted that it was "doubtful that the motion
was originally made in good faith, and it is quite obvious that the defendant seeks to rely upon technicalities that have no merit." 4
The question of adequate state grounds was also raised in State v.
White 5 and in Parker v. State.3 6 Both arose under the North Carolina
Post-Conviction Hearing Act37 and are considered elsewhere in this sur38
vey.
Admissibility of Confessions (in General)
Confessions are either voluntary or involuntary. They are called voluntary when made neither under the influence of hope or fear, but are
attributable to that love of truth which predominates in the breast of
every man ....

39

This rule, which governed the admission of extra-judicial confessions
into evidence more than a century before Miranda v. Arizona,40 was applied by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Gibson.41 A fifteen year old was arrested and charged with first degree burglary and
larceny of an automobile. After being given the Miranda warnings, he
20 272 N.C. at 518-19, 158 S.E.2d at 337.
a'Id.

-'376U.S. 773 (1964); accord, Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964).
"372 U.S. 391 (1963).
272 N.C. at 519, 158 S.E.2d at 337.
"274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473 (1968).
2 N.C. App. 27, 162 S.E.2d 526 (1968).

N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§§ 15-217 to -222 (1965).

See p. 501 infra.
"State v. Gibson, 2 N.C. App. 187, 190, 162 S.E.2d 627, 628-29 (1968), quoting
from State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259, 261 (1827).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"2 N.C. App. 187, 162 S.E.2d 627 (1968).
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was questioned by the arresting officers. At trial, an investigating officer
testified that before the defendant confessed to the crime, he had promised
him that "if he would tell me, I would in any way assist him or help him
Reversing the conviction, the court held that this
as a youngster."'
statement promised hope to the defendant and thus destroyed the voluntariness of the confession. Furthermore, "any subsequent confession is
presumed to proceed from the same vitiating influence, and the burden is
on the State to establish the voluntary character of the subsequent confession before it can be received in evidence." 4'
Admissibility of Confessions (under Miranda)
The recently-passed Federal Crime Control Act" obviously arose out of
the national feeling that the criminal confession tests prescribed by Miranda v. Arizon 4 5 seriously hamper police effectiveness against crime. By
its term the Act can apply only to the federal courts ;46 yet it possibly will
have a significant impact upon the states, unless the United States Supreme
Court declares it unconstitutional. For if the Act is permitted to do away
with the Miranda standards in federal courts, how can the Supreme Court
continue to hold that the warnings are constitutionally compelled when a
confession is admitted in state courts? In other words, if the Act is constitutional, then it would seem to follow that the Miranda decision is not
compelled by the Bill of Rights at all but that the specific warnings set
out in that decision are really legislative standards governing police conduct. If the standards are changed in federal courts by an act of Congress,
it would not appear that the Supreme Court could logically compel the
" Id.at 189, 162 S.E.2d at 628.
"8
Id. at 190, 162 S.E.2d at 629, quoting from State v. Hammer, 240 N.C. 85, 88,
81 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1954).
" Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351
(June 19, 1968).
" 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"C
The Act, cited note 44 supra, includes in § 3501 the following language in
reference to federal criminal trials:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including... (2) whether... defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he
was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could
be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised
prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.

19691
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states to continue to follow the standards of Miranda,which Congress has
legislatively determined no longer necessary in federal prosecutions.
Though the constitutionality of the Federal Crime Control Act has
not yet been decided, the North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
declined to allow the technicalities of Miranda to exclude evidence in state
trials of confessions given during custodial interrogation. A case in point
is State v. Meadows,17 where defendant was convicted of killing one Newman. When police officers arrived at the scene of the shooting, they found
Newman lying on the ground and the defendant and members of his
family standing in the yard. In response to a general inquiry, the defendant replied "I shot him." Without giving the Miranda warnings, the
officers then had the defendant relate the circumstances surrounding the
shooting. At trial, defendant told a different story and the officers were
called to the stand to impeach him.
In affirming the admissibility of the policeman's testimony, the court
held that the Miranda warnings were not required at the time this confession was given.4" The court noted that the primary purpose of Miranda
was to alleviate the pressures of custodial interrogation as were found in
Escobedo v. Illinois,49 and that it did not apply to general on-the-scene
investigation. Further, though he was a suspect, the police were still seeking facts to determine if a crime had been committed. °
Undoubtedly there was the general on-the-scene questioning, excepted
by Miranda, at least until the defendant admitted shooting Newman. It
is questionable, however, whether the exemption really continued after
defendant's admission. This case differs from State v. Hayes,5 where the
defendant, after admitting the theft of the car to the arresting officer,
volunteered further inconsequential information. The subsequent information in Meadows was elicited by the investigating officers and later used
to impeach the defendant. While it is arguable that the admission of this
confession did not violate the letter of Miranda, it appears inconsistent
with its policy, although the court obviously felt otherwise.
Another illustrative case is State v. Bishop."2 One of the Miranda
dictates is that "any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." 3
"272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638 (1968).
,8 Id. at 337, 158 S.E.2d at 645.
- 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
50 272 N.C. at 337, 158 S.E.2d at 645.
'273 N.C. 712, 161 S.E.2d 185 (1968).
272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968).
' 384 U.S. at 474.
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In Bishop the defendant, after being warned of his rights, refused to
make a statement to the arresting officers. The following day he was interrogated again after being given the warnings and this time made a
confession. In holding this confession to be voluntary, the court stated
that the assertion of the privilege did not preclude forever further questioning. Apparently the defendant was held to have voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to remain silent by confessing after he had received
this second Miranda warning. But Miranda regards police-initiated interrogation in custody as inherently coercive. Furthermore, the second interrogation was conducted after defendant had spent a night in custody and
without the presence of counsel. It was this very setting that the Supreme
Court in Miranda felt would taint any later confession as was present in
Bishop:
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing
a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.' 4
Moreover, the court in Bishop noticeably omitted any reference to the
specific act by which the defendant effectuated his waiver. The record,
as the court quotes it, shows only that the warnings were given and that
the defendant then confessed. Under these circumstances Miranda clearly
requires that there be a "voluntary and knowing" waiver, and that the
court find some affirmation of the waiver other than that the defendant
did in fact confess after the warnings were given.
5 that the Miranda
The court of appeals held in State v. Branch"
guidelines are not applicable to the retrial of a case where the original trial
occurred before Miranda became effective. The Supreme Court had left
this question unanswered when it decided, in Johnson,v. New Jersey,"0 that
Miranda applied only to trials begun after the decision was announced.
The court of appeals reasoned that the "guidelines were intended to be
applicable to future interrogation" 5 7 -the time of interrogation rather
than the time of trial being the critical factor. As for dictum in a North
Carolina Supreme Court case that Miranda should be applied to retrials, 8
the court of appeals maintained that that "statement . . . obviously was
4I d.

1 N.C. App. 279, 161 S.E.2d 492 (1968); accord, State v. Lewis, 1 N.C. App.
296, 161 S.E.2d 497 (1968).
56384 U.S. 719 (1966).
1 N.C. App. at 282, 161 S.E.2d at 494.
State v. Jackson, 270 N.C. 773, 155 S.E.2d 236 (1967). The court held: "We
must now allow a new trial for the reasons stated later, and at that time the Miranda
case will be applicable." Id. at 774, 155 S.E.2d at 237.
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not necessary to a decision in the case and we are convinced that our
Supreme Court has not ruled upon the question . . . ."" While such an
interpretation of Johnson is possible, it is hoped that when this issue
reaches the North Carolina Supreme Court, it will overrule the Branch
decision consistent with the dictum in Jackson. The California Supreme
Court in People v. Doherty 0 succinctly states what should be the overriding policy considerations, especially when the supreme court is in reality
free to interpret Johnson as it chooses:
We cannot apply a truncated version of the Constitution to the
forthcoming proceeding merely because it is a second trial. We cannot
rationally forbid the use of statements violative of Miranda for defendants first tried after June 13, 1966, and sanction such use for those
This defentried at that time after an earlier nullified proceeding ....
dant on retrial is surely entitled to no less protection of the Constitution
61
than one simultaneously brought to trial for the first time.
Double Jeopardy and Retroactivity
In State v. Meadows,6 2 noted in connection with coerced confessions,
the defendant was accused, convicted, and sentenced for the crime of felonious assault. Subsequently, the victim of the assault died and defendant
was tried and convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant asserted the defense of former jeopardy, contending that he could not be
tried twice because both charges arose out of the same conduct, i.e., the
one shooting.
Following the great weight of authority, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that there was no merit in the plea of former conviction. The
court pointed out that two distinct offenses were alleged-the distinction
being that one required that the victim not die.63 Hence, the court held
that one did not bar a trial of the other.64 The court ruled, however, that
the sentences were to be served concurrently, and the time already served
under the first sentence was to be subtracted from the second. 5
If the sentences were to run consecutively rather than concurrently,
would the court have allowed the conviction for felonious assault to stand,
when one element of the offense (that the victim did not die) is admittedly
161 S.E.2d at 495.
1 N.C. App. at 283,
Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967).
Id. at 21, 429 P.2d at 185, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
S.E.2d 638 (1968).
0 272 N.C. 327, 158
o Id. at 331, 158 S.E.2d at 641.
'I1d. at 332-33, 158 S.E.2d at 642.
" This was done under the court's general power to supervise and control the
proceedings of inferior courts under N.C. CONsT. art. 4, § 10. 272 N.C. at 339, 158
S.E.2d at 646.
0067
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missing? The appeal in question was not from the felonious assault conviction, however, and the court did not consider that question. In any
event, the fact that a concurrent sentence was given makes the question
moot in this case.
Of more substance is a further supposition: what if the defendant had
been acquitted in the first trial? Whether the acquittal of felonious assault
would bar a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter was not expressly
decided in Meadows." Should the issue arise, however, it is not clear that
the same substantive facts would indeed be tried twice. The crime of
felonious assault requires a specific intent, i.e., the intent to kill. 7 Though
defendant could be acquitted of this charge because of the state's failure
to prove the prerequisite intent, the victim's death might still place defendant in jeopardy of conviction for unlawful homocide, which might
not require a specific intent but only that an unlawful act on part of the
defendant result in death-for example, if death resulted from simple
assault.
In State v. Pardon,8 the court held that although an amendment increasing punishment could not constitutionally be applied to the defendant, 9 where "the law under which a defendant was convicted is amended
pending appeal so as to mitigate the punishment, it is logical to assume
that the legislature intended the new punishment, which it now feels fits
the crime, to apply whenever possible. ' 70 This case is discussed in a previous issue of the Law Review71 and will not be considered here.
Right to Counsel
In Gideon v. Wainwright,72 the United States Supreme Court interpreted the sixth and fourteenth amendments to mean that counsel must
be provided for criminal defendants unable to employ counsel, unless the
indigent competently and intelligently waived this right. In Miranda v.
Arizona," the Court expanded the right to include the requirement that
the record must show than an accused was offered counsel but intelligently
and understandingly rejected the offer prior to submitting to custodial
interrogation.
" Id. at 332, 158 S.E.2d at 641.
"N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1953).
88272 N.C. 72, 157 S.E.2d 698 (1967).
272 N.C. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 701, 702.
7°Id. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 702.
"'Note, Constitutional Law-Chronic Alcoholism and the Eighth Anendmnent
in North Carolina,46 N.C.L. REv. 909, 913 (1968).
" 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The major issue left undecided after those decisions is at what stage
in the criminal proceedings the state must provide counsel for the defendant. North Carolina decisions turn on whether the proceedings are at a
"critical" stage. In State v. Bentley, 4 the court reaffirmed its holding in
Gasque v. State,7 5 that counsel is not required at a preliminary hearing
8 however,
because it is not deemed a critical stage. In State v. Wright,"
the court ruled that taking a defendant from a line-up interrogation room
was a crucial step necessitating a lawyer. Defendant had been picked up
on a "peeping tom" charge, following a rape in the neighborhood. The
illiterate defendant, although unwilling to sign a written waiver of his
right to counsel during a line-up, had orally agreed to be in one. The rape
victim could not identify the defendant in the line-up, and she asked that
he be taken to a room and told to repeat the words spoken to her by the
rapist. The defendant was not advised of his right to counsel at this stage,
and the victim identified him as the rapist.
In reversing the conviction, the court noted that the line-up was a
77
crucial stage in the proceedings under the rule of United States v. Wade.
Although it held that the waiver at this stage was voluntary, despite defendant's illiteracy, lack of mental capacity, and his susceptibility to persuasion,7 the court did not find that defendant intelligently waived his
right to counsel after the line-up and held the extra-judicial identification
to be a violation of his constitutional rights to have a lawyer. The court
said:
When he was taken from the line-up, made to put on dark pants and a
light shirt and his cap, and then exhibited to the prosecutrix for identification while required to repeat the words allegedly spoken by her
assailant at the time the crime was committed and required to walk back
and forth so she could observe his walk, the proceeding lost its character
as a pretrial investigative procedure and became a "critical" stage requiring the presence of counsel.... Likewise, her in-court identification
of defendant is incompetent unless it can be shown to have had an indeand did not not result from the illegal, out-of-court conpendent origin
79
frontation.
In applying the "independent origin" test to the in-court identification by
the prosecutrix, the court followed Wong Sun v. United States. 0 While
1 N.C. App. 365, 161 S.E.2d 650 (1968).
271 N.C. 323, 156 S.E.2d 740 (1967); accord, State v. Clark, 272 N.C. 282,
158 S.E.2d 705 (1968).
"274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968).
"388 U.S. 218 (1967).
274 N.C. at 94, 161 S.E.2d at 589.
Id. at 94-95, 161 S.E.2d at 590.
80371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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that case did not involve line-ups, it did set forth the principle that evidence obtained as a result of illegal acts by law enforcement officers is
inadmissable at trial. The court was correct in analogizing the in-court
identification with the illegally-obtained evidence in Wong Sun, for there
can be little doubt that the out-of-court confrontation with the defendant
influenced the prosecutrix in her in-court identification.
The Wright decision is also in line with the Gideon and Miranda decisions. While it is arguable that defendant's waiver of his right to counsel in the line-up was not voluntary, this question is moot under the holding of State v. Ross,81 since no evidence obtained at this stage was used
against the defendant. Further, the court apparently limited Wright in
State v. Thorpe,12 where it was held that the waiver must be "intelligent."
In Re Kincheloe83 involved the defendant's right to counsel in a hearing before the North Carolina Board of Medical Examiners to determine
whether or not his license to practice medicine was to be revoked for "conduct unbecoming and not in keeping with his professional status." The
specific charge was that the defendant had taken sexual liberties with a
young female patient while she was under the influence of a drug administered by him.
A state statute8 4 guarantees the defendant both the right to counsel
and the right to cross-examine witnesses. At this hearing, the doctor stated
that he did not have counsel and that he did not think he needed it. Defendant further stated to the board that he did not want to cross-examine
the adverse witnesses, but simply wished to state his version of the facts.
Accordingly, he asked to be dismissed until the adverse witnesses were
through testifying and his request was granted. In affirming the revocation of his license, the court held that this was a knowing waiver of
the right to counsel and cross-examination.
While it is true that the defendant did know of his right to counsel
at the hearing and expressly waived it, under the facts it is arguable that
the waiver was without full knowledge. The record discloses that the
defendant had been acquitted in a criminal action arising from the same
facts, and the doctor might have thought he would not need counsel
because he believed the criminal charges would be res judicata in this
hearing. If so, the waiver would not be a "knowing" one, made competently and intelligently as required by Miranda. The more likely as81273

N.C. 498, 160 S.E.2d 465 (1968).

82274

N.C. 457, 164 S.E.2d 171 (1968).

"8272N.C. 116, 157 S.E.2d 833 (1967).
, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.2 (1953).
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sumption, however, is that the defendant's refusal of counsel was part
of a strategy to convince the members of the board of his innocence by
an exhibition of supreme confidence.
Search and Seizure
In State v. Howard,5 defendants appealed their conviction for murder, asserting as error, among other things, the admission in evidence of
a blood-stained shirt worn by one of the defendants, Howard. Having
probable cause to suspect Howard's involvement,"' a deputy sheriff had
gone to his room and found the defendant absent. The door was open,
however, and the blood-stained shirt was in plain view.sT
In affirming the admission of the shirt, the court expressly adopted
89
s
the reasoning of Maryland Penitentiaryv. Haydenf that mere evidence
may be admitted at trial if (1) obtained by an officer who has probable
cause to believe that there is sufficient nexus between the item and the
crime as to aid in the apprehension or conviction of the defendant and
(2) if the item is discovered while in the process of arresting the defendant or searching for him with probable cause that he is there.90 There
is little question that the seizure of the shirt satisfied the Hayden requirements.
Howard is the first opportunity that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has had to adopt the Hayden rule, since prior cases dealt with evidence seized in the possession of the defendant. 1 The new test appears
to be a compromise between a desire to afford defendants the fourth
amendment protections and a desire not to hamper severely police effectiveness, for the rule both retains the requirement that the search and seizure
be with reasonable cause and precludes, when the first condition is met,
the purely technical defense of "mere evidence," which, when uncontrolled,
was often unreasonably restrictive.
In affirming the findings of the trial judge in Howard, the court
demonstrated again the fact that in search and seizure cases, as in coerced
confession cases, 2 the admission of the evidence is a question for the trial
" 274 N.C. 186, 162 S.E.2d 495 (1968).
11Id. at 202, 162 S.E.2d at 505.
87 Id.
88 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"' Mere evidence is simply evidence that is innocent by nature as opposed to
instrumentalities, fruits of the crime, or contraband.
00274 N.C. at 201-02, 162 S.E.2d at 505.
" E.g., State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E.2d 269 (1967).
92 E.g., State v. Bently, 1 N.C. App. 365, 161 S.E.2d 650 (1968) ; State v. Greenlee, 272 N.C. 651, 159 S.E.2d 22 (1967).
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judge alone. In State v. Pike,3 the court seems to have extended that
rule by holding that the jury must be absent when the determination of
admissibility is made. Prior cases had not required the absence of the jury
as a condition for determining admissibility. 4 The court reasoned that
if the jurors hear subsequently excluded testimony, their minds may be
prejudiced by it."5
The standing of an automobile passenger to object to a search of the
vehicle was presented to the court in State v. Raynes. I" In holding that
the search was valid when consented to by the owner, the court distin9 7 Jones had held that a deguished the case of Jones v. United States.
fendant merely present in the premises-and lawfully so-had standing
to object to a search so long as he had a substantial interest to protect.9 8
Here the owner was in the possession of the automobile and the defendant
was a guest. The court's distinction of Jones is therefore questionable.
And beyond this there is language in the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Katz v. United States") that could possibly change the
result. In Katz the Supreme Court said: "Once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."'"0 If then the law of trespass has no
bearing on search and seizure cases, can it be said that even though there
was no trespass by law enforcement officers in Raynes (since the car owner consented to the search), the search nevertheless violated the privacy
interests of the guest?

Criminal Law and Procedure
SANCTIONING LAW

In several recent decisions, the North Carolina courts have considered
the extent to which the senteriqe imposed in a prior trial limits the sentence that may be imposed on retrial of the same defendant. Two sig" 273 N.C. 102, 159 S.E.2d 334 (1968).
"E.g., State v. Harper, 235 N.C. 62, 69 S.E.2d 161 (1952); State v. Fogleman,
204 N.C. 401, 168 S.E. 536 (1933).
"5 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
98272 N.C. 488, 158 S.E.2d 351 (1968).
or362 U.S. 257 (1959).
9

98Id.at

265.

o389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353.

100
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nificant issues were discussed: (1) whether a harsher sentence at the
second trial is forbidden and (2) whether credit must be given for the
time already served on the first sentence.
In Patton v. North Carolina,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

answered the first issue in the affirmative by holding that the imposition
of a harsher sentence on retrial was a violation of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy. The North Carolina courts, however, have
refused to follow Patton. In State v. Paige,2 the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years for robbery, but his conviction was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court. Upon retrial he was sentenced to a
term of twenty-seven years. The defendant in State v. Morris"was given
an active sentence of eighteen months for drunken driving in a trial de
novo in superior court, having appealed a two-year suspended sentence
given by a recorder's court.
The supreme court in Paige and the court of appeals in Morris emphasized the conflict among the federal courts of appeals on the question
decided by Patton.4 The supreme court in Paige offered the justification that new evidence might have been introduced at the second trial,
a proposition Patton specifically rejected as irrelevant. In Morris the
North Carolina Court of Appeals reiterated that the judge at the second
trial must have discretion to enter a sentence based on his independent
judgment. In neither Paige nor Morris did the courts discuss the constitutional objections raised in the Patton decision.
In the recent case of State v. Stafford,5 however, the supreme court
squarely addressed itself to the constitutional issues involved and again
rejected Patton. In Stafford the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges
against him at his first trial and received a sentence of ten to eighteen
years. After being awarded a new trial, defendant was convicted again
and this time was sentenced to a term of thirteen to eighteen years. Defendant sought relief from this harsher sentence primarily on the basis
of Patton. The supreme court, after again noting the split on this issue
among the states and various courts of appeals, examined and rejected
1381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968), noted In Note,
Criminal Law-Sentencing-Denialof Credit for Time Served or Longer Sentence
Imposed at Retrial, 46 N.C.L. Rxv. 407 (1968).
2272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d 522 (1968).
'2 N.C. App. 262, 163 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
'The third, seventh, and tenth circuits have approved harsher sentences following retrial. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
889 (1967); United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
v. Rodriguez, 375 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1967).
389 U.S. 1052 (1968); Newman
- N.C. -, - S.E.2d - (1968).
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all three of the grounds for the Patton decision. The court agreed that
no person should be penalized for the exercise of his constitutional rights
or right of appeal, but rejected the notion that the North Carolina rule
penalizes the person in the exercise of his constitutional rights. The
court held that unless it affirmatively appears that the harsher sentence
was imposed to penalize the person in exercising his rights, the harsher
sentence could be justified.
Stafford makes it clear that North Carolina courts will continue to
reject Patton unless the United States Supreme Court resolves the conflict among the circuits in its favor. In Patton the court of appeals concluded that the risk of a greater sentence "may prevent defendants who
have been unconstitutionally convicted from attempting to seek redress"'
and that the "opportunity for unfairness"'7 was too great to allow the
imposition of a harsher sentence. Noting how infrequently its decision
would result in inadequate punishment, the court stated that "[e]ven the
appearance of improper motivation is a disservice to the administration
of justice."' The court concluded that to condition the securing of a
constitutional right by forcing upon the defendant the risk of harsher
punishment offends due process. One recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court has used similar language. In United States v. Jackson,9
the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Federal Kidnapping
Act that authorized capital punishment only if "the jury shall so recommend." Justice Stewart's majority opinion held that this provision imposed "an impermissible burden" on the exercise of constitutional rights.
Whether Jackson will be applied to the Patton situation remains to be
seen.
In contrast to its position on harsher sentences on retrial, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has ordered trial courts to given defendants
credit for time already served in several recent decisions where the defendant was sentenced on retrial. In State v. Meadows,'0 a situation of
"rare occurrence," Meadows was originally convicted of felonious assault, but after commencement of the sentence, the victim died and the
state indicted the defendant for murder. Upholding a conviction for
manslaughter at the second trial, the court "in exercise of its 'general
supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts', cono 381 F.2d at 639.

7Id. at 641.
8Id.
390 U.S. 570 (1968), noted in Note, Criminal Law--United States v. Jackson

and Its Impact Upon State Capital Punishment Legislation, supra p. 421.
- 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638 (1968).
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ferred by Article IV, Section 10, of the Constitution of North Carolina"" held that the defendant should be given credit for time served in
computing the length of his imprisonment on the manslaughter sentence.
In State v. Paige," where Paige was retried for the same offense, the
court, without elaboration, granted the defendant credit for time already
served. In Stafford the court continued this practice by giving defendant
credit for the time he had served. Despite this practice the "credit" becomes more illusory than real when the trial judge at the second trial imposes a harsher sentence.
SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

Admissibility and Sufficiency of Evidence
The joint trial of criminal defendants offers a unique opportunity
for abuse of discretion by the trial judge if he does not conduct the trial
with extreme caution. In State v. Paige,'" the petitioner and four other
defendants were charged and convicted of robbery. At the trial, testimony of two co-defendants implicated Paige, and the court also allowed,
for purpose of corroboration, hearsay testimony by an investigating officer
as to statements made by the co-defendants to him. 14 The court said
there was no error in the admission of the hearsay testimony since the
jury was properly instructed, both before allowing its introduction and
during the charge, as to the use to be made of the testimony.
In State v. Squires,'" the trial court admitted testimony of an investigating officer as to extrajudicial statements made by a co-defendant that
implicated the appellant Squires, as well as the declarant. The evidence,
however, was not for corroboration purposes and after its admission, the
court, upon request, instructed the jury to disregard it insofar as it implicated Squires. But in the court's recapitulation of evidence in the
charge, the inadmissible evidence was included. The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that while it "might be justified in saying the in11Id. at 339, 158 S.E.2d at
12272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d
1 I1d.

646.
522 (1968).

,Inmost jurisdictions evidence in support of a witness's credibility will not be
received unless he has been directly impeached, and then only under more or less

severe restrictions. In North Carolina, however, the utmost latitude is allowed;
although the necessity of some kind of impeachment is often recognized, this may
be "at times by his very position in reference to the cause and its parties." D.
STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAw OF EVIDENCE § 50 (2d ed. 1963). North
Carolina has repeatedly allowed prior consistent statements for corroboration of a
witness after there has been this minimal impeachment. Id. § 51. However, they
"are admitted, not as substantive evidence of the facts stated, but solely for the
credibility." Id. § 52.
purpose of affirming the witness's
' 272 N.C. 402, 158 S.E.2d 345 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

struction to the jury to disregard the evidence would cure the error"1 in
originally admitting the evidence, the repetition of it in the charge necessitated a new trial. Several jurisdictions have gone further and said that
even where there is an- instruction to disregard, the defendant is entitled
to a new trial because of the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence.1
In Paige the use of a joint trial by the State was not as offensive as in
Squires since the evidence entered against Paige would be admissible if
Paige were tried separately, being either firsthand observation testimony
by the co-defendants or corroboration of the co-defendants testimony by
prior consistent statements. That the testimony was related by alleged accomplices only went to the weight of the evidence and here the court properly emphasized that that testimony should be closely scrutinized 1 The
corroboration then only added slight support for the evidence. In Squires,
however, the testimony of the officer would be inadmissible hearsay if
Squires were given a separate trial, though admissible against the codefendant as firsthand observation. The better approach in this latter
situation, if the prejudicial evidence cannot be effectively deleted, is
either not to admit the evidence or to allow separate trials.
Judicial efficiency should be subordinated when it runs counter to the
need to insure fair trials and to protect the fundamental constitutional
rights inherent in the concept of a fair trial. The ability of jurors, or
anyone else, to separate evidence and consider it against only one of
several defendants is highly doubtful.Y Even in a joint trial as apparently unobjectionable as that in Paige, there is a real possibility of overlap
at 407, 158 S.E.2d at 348.
In People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965),
the California Supreme Court adopted rules to govern this situation. The court
said that
[wihen the prosecution proposes to introduce into evidence an extrajudicial
statement of one defendant that implicates codefendant, the trial court must
adopt one of the following procedures: (1) It can permit a joint trial if all
parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants can be and
are effectively deleted without prejudice to the defendant . . . . (2) It can
grant a severance of trials if the prosecution insists that it must use the extrajudicial statements and it appears that effective deletions cannot be made.
(3) If the prosecution has successfully resisted a motion for severance and
thereafter offers an extrajudicial statement implicating a codefendant, the
trial court must exclude it if effective deletions are not possible.
Id. at 530-31, 407 P.2d at 272-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61. However, the court noted
that in the absence of a United States Supreme Court holding that the due process
clause requires such a result, rules were to be regarded "not as constitutionally
"Id.
'-

compelled but as judicially declared rules of practice ....

"

Id. at 530, 407 P.2d at

272, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
1272 N.C. at 422, 158 S.E.2d at 526.
"People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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of evidence in the minds of jurors, which creates a substantial hazard
that when evidence is introduced, although admissible against only one,
it will implicate several of the defendants.
A related problem-whether the unsupported testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to convict-was presented in State v. Partlov'ti and
State v. McNair. 1 The supreme court in both cases held such testimony
is sufficient if the jury is satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Partlow and McNair, two alleged accomplices provided the only testimony implicating the defendants, but each defendant
introduced conflicting evidence. Furthermore, in Partlow the two accomplices had pleaded guilty and were awaiting sentence. The supreme court
noted, however, that there was no evidence that any threats or promises
of reward were made to the witnesses. But is it realistic to expect the
defendant to be able to introduce such evidence of improper inducements? Certainly no one would contend that the offeror-the prosecutor-would testify to this, and the beneficiaries-the accomplices-have
a vested interest in concealing their acceptance of any such surreptitious
promises. Even in McNair, where the accomplices had already commenced the serving of their sentences, there remains the possibility that
the accomplices felt that at least their testimony would be favorably considered later by the parole board.
Because of the opportunity for a miscarriage of justice in this situation, approximately one-half of the states by either statute or court
decision now require some support for the testimony of the accomplices
before the jury is allowed to consider the issue of guilt 2 Such a rule
provides some safeguard against persons being convicted upon the perjured testimony of alleged accomplices. In the Partlow situation, where
the defendant was convicted for being an accessory before and after the
fact, the alleged accomplices could conjure up a story to implicate the
defendant and unless the defendant could produce witnesses who could
contradict the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as to the defendant's
whereabouts at the time of his alleged involvement, an innocent defendant
could be convicted. A similar wrong could be perpetrated in the factual
20272 N.C. 60, 157 S.E.2d 688 (1967).

N.C. 130, 157 S.E.2d 660 (1967).
"The North Carolina Supreme Court earlier recognized the conflict among the
states as to whether such unsupported testimony was sufficient to convict. State
v. Saunders, 245 N.C. 338, 95 S.E.2d 876 (1957). At that time a large majority
of the states were in accord with the North Carolina court. However, recently
there has been a trend contrary to the North Carolina rule; the court in Partlow
and McNair was content to reiterate the rule without noting the changes in other
states.
21272
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setting of McNair, where, although the defendant allegedly participated
in the crime, the victim for some reason does not testify.
State v. Propst' dealt with the problem of sufficiency of evidence in
a totally different context. There the defendant who was charged with
first degree murder introduced evidence as to his intoxicated condition,
but the court neglected to refer to this in its charge to the jury. The
North Carolina Supreme Court held that while the intoxication evidence
was insufficient to find that the defendant was "utterly unable"14 to form
the requisite intent, the evidence, especially that showing provocation,
when considered in connection with other testimony introduced was sufficient to be submitted to the jury for consideration on the issue of intent.
CRIME AND DEFENSE

North Carolina does not require a conspiracy indictment to name all
conspirators. In State v. Gallimorel however, the court emphasized
that the better practice was to identify all the conspirators, and if the
state fails to disclose the names of co-conspirators, either in the indictment or otherwise, the court, on motion, should order them disclosed.
Although the indictment in Gallimore only referred to the defendant and
"others," the court noted that the state later disclosed the names of the
"others," and thus complied with the preferred practice. Since, for purposes of preparation for trial, the defendant by court order can compel
disclosure under this North Carolina decision, there appears to be little
injustice by not requiring disclosure in the indictment.
To prove common law burglary it was generally necessary to show
breaking and entering of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime
with intent to commit a felony therein." However, by statute North
Carolina has made it a felony for a person, "with intent to commit a
felony or other infamous crime therein,"' 27 to "break or enter . . . any

storehouse, shop... or other building where any merchandise.., or other
personal property shall be... ."' In State v. Jones,2° although the defendant was charged with breaking and entering, the court instructed the
jury that under the statute breaking or entering was sufficient if it found
23274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560 (1968).
24

To negate the specific intent required by means of proof of intoxication, it is
necessary to show that the defendant was "utterly unable" to form the requisite
intent.
2 272 N.C. 528, 158 S.E.2d 505 (1968).
"R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 149 (1957).
'T N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1967).
"Id. (emphasis added).
"272 N.C. 108, 157 S.E.2d 610 (1967).
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the necessary felonious intent. After the jury returned a guilty verdict,
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for five to seven years.
On its face, the statute does not appear to be particularly objectionable, though punishing mere breaking, uncoupled with an entry, as a
felony might seem harsher than the common law, under which an attempt to commit an indictable offense is punished as a misdemeanor. The
reason for the harsher penalty is that breaking with the required felonious
intent constitutes itself an indictable act and portends further injury to
property and possibly human safety. The legislature seems to have acted
within the bounds of sound public policy in making the act of breaking
alone sufficient to subject the perpetrator to prosecution for a felony.
Although the statute may be sound, its application in Jones is questionable. There the evidence showed that the defendant told the person
who drove him to the vicinity of the alleged crime that he was going to
collect money owed him and that if this were not paid, he was going 2to
steal some shotguns from the alleged debtor. When the defendant broke
a window in the store of the alleged debtor, the owner shot at him. The
defendant then returned to the car and told the driver what had happened. Of course, sufficient evidence is shown to satisfy the breaking
requirement, but what of the requisite intent? Is the breaking combined
with the statements to the driver sufficient? The court in Jones held in
the affirmative, but more specific evidence of ifitent should be required.
Jones is the first case that has considered the problem of breaking
without entering, and a possible explanation for the court's decision is
that it still relied on the reasoning employed when entering was a requirement. When common law breaking and entering was shown, the court
very reasonably required little evidence to show intent, for the act of
entering itself indicates strongly the requisite intent. However, under
the new statute where only breaking is charged, the courts should make
the evidentiary requirements for showing intent more stringent, for the
act of breaking carries less an inference of guilty intent than if entering
were also involved.
If A, in attempting to kill B, inadvertently kills C, the intent to kill
B is, in the legal context, "transferred" to C. Homicide cases involving
the issue of transferred intent rarely occur. However, in State v. Rogers"°
the North Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to affirm its
adherence to the near universal rules3 1 concerning the issue. All courts
agree that where criminal responsibility would be imposed if the intended
0 273 N.C. 330, 159 S.E.2d 900 (1968).
" 26 Ai. JJR. Homicide § 35 (1940).
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victim had been killed, the defendant is not excused by the fact that the
wrong person was slain. Disagreement centers on whether the slayer
would be convicted of the same degree of offense as he would have been
had the person intended to be killed been killed in fact. Where express
malice or premeditation and deliberation are required for first degree
murder, a few courts have said that the crime should be second degree
murder or manslaughter,8 2 thus obviating the necessity of resorting to
the transferred intent fiction.
North Carolina, however, in accord with most states, follows the
rule that the grade of the offense is the same as if the intended victim
were slain. 3 In cases where the slaying of the intended victim would
have been justified or excused, the defendant still might be convicted for
some lesser crime if he failed to use proper care in his defense, thus
resulting in the homicide of a third party.3 4
When a defendant relies on self-defense as justification for homicide
in North Carolina, he has the burden of proving his defense to the "satisfaction of the jury." 5 In State v. Calloway,0 the trial court in describing this burden to the jury said it was more stringent than "by the greater
weight of the evidence" and less exacting than "beyond a reasonable
doubt. 'a7 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held it error to instruct
that "the greater weight of the evidence" would not meet the requirements for justification. The court said that although in North Carolina
the defendant no longer had to prove his excuse beyond a reasonable
doubt, "the intensity of proof required to 'satisfy the jury' "38 could not
be defined by the court "as being 'less than,' 'the same as,' or 'more than'
the greater weight of the evidence. .

..

""

The standard of "to the satisfaction of the jury" seems to provide
jurors too much discretion and too much opportunity to vent their prejudices. Their general approval or disapproval of defendant's actions apparently could too often determine the burden of proof with such a generalized standard. Of course the court determines the minimum amount
of proof sufficient for justification, since it decides whether the evidence
2 See,

e.g., Bratton v. State, 29 Tenn. 103 (1849); McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33

(1860).
"3See, e.g., State v. Burney, 215 N.C. 598, 3 S.E.2d 24 (1939); State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374, 174 S.E. 105 (1934).
" See 26 Am. JUR. supra note 31.
" State v. Ellick, 60 N.C. 450, 462 (1864).
"1 N.C. App. 150, 160 S.E.2d 501 (1968).
37 Id. at 150, 160 S.E.2d at
503.
8
'Id. at 154, 160 S.E.2d at 504.
"Id.
0
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is adequate for the jury to consider the issue. Nevertheless, it seems that
the somewhat more precise standard of "greater weight of the evidence"
or "preponderance of the evidence" would better fulfill the purposes of
the criminal laws. Accordingly, many jurisdictions have adopted this
more precise "preponderance of the evidence" rule, while some have even
retained the requirement that some affirmative defenses be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Both of these standards tend to neutralize
the individual prejudices of the jurors while leaving enough flexibility
to perpetuate justice.
Where a defendant attempts to excuse his crime by proving insanity,
unnecessary prejudices can result in allowing the issues of present mental
capacity and ability to conduct a rational defense to be considered by the
jury along with the general issue of criminal responsibility, which depends
on the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. During the trial in
State v. Propst,4 ' the court admitted evidence as to the defendant's mental
condition both at the time of the crime and at the time of the trial. The
supreme court acknowledged that the defendant could be prejudiced by
the necessity for jurors to compartmentalize their minds and to disregard
evidence showing present sanity when considering the issue of insanity
at the time of commission of the offense. Further, it said the better
practice was for the issue of competence to stand trial to be determined
by the judge either with or without a jury before trial. Yet, the court
did not overrule cases allowing the joint submission of these issues to
the jury." Such an overruling seems not only desirable but reconcilable
with the court's stated position about the relative merits of the different
procedures.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

Guilty Pleas
Because of the frequency of guilty pleas, determining whether they
are made voluntarily and intelligently is a matter of no little importance.
In North Carolina, however, trial judges need not inquire into the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea. Instead, the trial judge is allowed
to assume that the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. In State
v. Abernathy,43 the defendant pleaded guilty to lesser offenses than those
"'See30 Amf. JUR. 2D Evideiwe § 1177, at 356 (1967).
' 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E.2d 560 (1968).

" See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 229 N.C. 251, 49 S.E.2d 458 (1948); State v.

Sandlin, 156 N.C. 624, 72 S.E. 203 (1911).
"1 N.C. App. 625, 162 S.E.2d 114 (1968) (per curiam).
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originally charged in the bill of indictment. The defendant contended
that it was error for the trial judge not to inquire of the defendant "if
his pleas were voluntarily made, if he understood what he was doing, and
if he authorized his counsel to enter the pleas in his behalf. '44 Quoting
from Chief Justice Parker's opinion in State v. Woody, 45 the court rejected the defendant's contentions stating that it "would find itself under
an avalanche of frivolous appeals" 46 if it required such an practice. The
court in Woody noted, however, that such inquiries would be "good practice." Furthermore, it reasoned that no honorable lawyer would enter
such a plea unless his client authorized him to do so and that generally
the legal profession was composed of honorable men.
Most other states require at least an inquiry as to whether the defendant entered his plea intelligentlyY The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure require the trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea, to address
the defendant personally and determine that the plea was made voluntarily
with an understanding of the charge and the consequences of the plea.4 8
Leaving such an inquiry to the unfettered discretion of the court, as is
done in North Carolina, is not satisfactory. Requiring such an inquiry
would impose very little burden on the trial judge, yet would offer the
defendant protection of important constitutional rights.49
As was implied in Abernathy, an "arrangement" between the prosecution and defense may have been made before trial that would make a
finding of voluntariness, rather than a plea induced by a promise of
leniency, difficult. Yet "[i] f the 'arrangement' is honored, under existing
precedents, then there should be no difficulty in having the conviction upheld on direct or collateral review." 50
The court of appeals considered the voluntariness of the petitioner's
confession in a post conviction hearing in Parker v. State.!1 There petitioner contended the guilty plea was a result of a coerced confession. The
court reasoned that in order for it to accept this contention the petitioner
must show two things: (1) that without the guilty plea the defendant
would have been found innocent and (2) that the confession was in fact
involuntary. As to the former, the court discarded the possibility that
"'Id.at 626, 162 S.E.2d at 115.
"-271 N.C. 544, 157 S.E.2d 108 (1967).
1 N.C. App. at 626, 162 S.E.2d at 115.
"See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 549 (1964).
"'FED. R. CRim. P. 11.
"' See Penegar, Crimninal Law and Procedure, Survey of North Carolina Case
Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 910, 931 (1967).
"oId. See United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir.
1963); Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958).
'2 N.C. App. 27, 162 S.E.2d 526 (1968).
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the defendant could make such a showing and stated that "there may well
have been strong evidence to establish defendant's guilt ... had the plea
of guilty not been entered, and it may have been that petitioner and his
trial counsel were aware of such evidence." 52 As to the requirement of
showing that the confession was made involuntarily, the court held that
the confession was voluntary, even though the evidence showed that the
defendant was held overnight without food in an unlighted cell; was
questioned twice, once in the morning and once the night before; and had
confessed before he saw his attorney. The report of the case does not state
whether he was given the Miranda warnings.5 3
The showing of an involuntary confession alone should be sufficient
for the petitioner to obtain a new trial on the ground that there was an
involuntary plea of guilty. Contrary to what the court said, it seems that
where the police obtain an involuntary confession, a plea of guilty is a
natural consequence, especially where the possible penalty for contesting
the issue of guilt is death. 4
Post Conviction Hearing
Providing a statutory substitute for common law habeas corpus and
corarn nobis was one of the purposes of the North Carolina Post Conviction Hearing Act enacted in 1965.r5 In two recent cases the North
Carolina courts interpreted the Act so as to deprive it of any real vitality.
In State v. White,5" the supreme court elaborated on what it conceived
to be the purposes and limits of the review under the Act. It reasoned
that the proceedings were not a substitute or an alternative to direct appeal, and that they were not designed to allow collateral attack upon any
ruling that could have properly been presented by a direct appeal from
the judgment pronounced in the original trial. Quoting from Miller v.
State, 7 the court said that the Act was enacted "to provide an adequate
and available post-trial remedy for persons imprisoned under judicial
decrees who suffered substantial and unadjudicated deprivation of their
constitutional rights in the original criminal actions resulting in their
52 Id. at 32, 162 S.E.2d at 529.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), may have significant effects on state statutes that provide a death-free guilty plea but submit a defendant to the risk of death if he chooses to contest his guilt.
See Alford v. North Carolina, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1968); Note Criminal LawUnited States v. Jackson and Its Impact Upon State Capital Punishment Legislation, supra p. 421.
N.C. GuN. STAT. § 15-217 (Supp. 1967).
M274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473 (1968).
-'237 N.C. 29, 74 S.E.2d 513 (1953).
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convictions because they were prevented from claiming such constitutional
rights in the original criminal actions by factors beyond their control."5
Both State v. White"9 and Parkerv. State0 presented situations where
it seems there were such "unadjudicated deprivations." In White after
the defendants were taken to the city jail, the police picked up the car
in which they were riding at the time of the arrest, took it to the city
jail, and searched it. A similar search in Preston v. United States"' was
held unreasonable, since it was neither incident to an arrest nor made
after obtaining a search warrant. In Parker the petitioner at the post
conviction hearing objected to the racial composition of the grand jury
and introduced statistical evidence that showed systematic exclusion of
negroes. In both cases, however, the courts held that by not properly
pursuing the issues of unreasonable search and seizure and systematic
exclusion, respectively, the petitioners had waived these constitutional
rights. The court in White held that although the fruits of the unreasonable search and seizure were objected to in the trial court, the petitioners
could have appealed on this basis, and, not having done so, the trial court
judgment was final. In Parker, by never raising the issue of systematic
exclusion, the petitioners were held to have waived the right to have the
issue determined and were thereby precluded from raising the issue in
the post conviction hearing. The court emphasized that the petitioners
were represented by counsel.
Reviewing the court's language, it is not clear exactly what constitutional issues that generally would be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding
could successfully be considered under the Post Conviction Hearing Act.
Issues previously adjudicated at the trial will not be considered; yet procedural rules will eliminate issues not raised, especially where there is
adequate counsel. Apparently the denial of the right to counsel would
be grounds for a new trial. But, what else, if any, would be cannot
be easily discerned on the basis of the court's interpretation of the Act.
Although the state courts have limited the scope of North Carolina's
post conviction hearing, federal habeas corpus relief is still available even
where there has been a "procedural default" in raising the federal question. In Fay v. Noia,"2 the defendant, as in White, failed to seek direct
review of his conviction, but the United States Supreme Court held that
Noia was entitled to habeas corpus relief. It concluded that "the doctrine
;8Id. at 51, 74 S.E.2d at 528-29.
274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473 (1968).
"02 N.C. App. 27, 162 S.E.2d 526 (1968).
01376 U.S. 364 (1964).
0 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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under which state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate
and independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review
is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts under
the federal habeas corpus statute." 6 Further, the Court interpreted the
meaning of failure to exhaust "the remedies available in the courts of
the state"6 as required by the federal habeas corpus statute, to mean only
"a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at the time
he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal court."'6 5 The
Court concluded that Noia's failure to appeal was not an intelligent and
understanding waiver of his rights. Moreover, Townsend v. Sain,"6
handed down on the same day as Noia, expanded the power of federal
judges to hold evidentiary hearings concerning the federal claim involved
in the habeas corpus proceeding. This power was expanded to include
most instances where at the original trial there was, for any reason, an
inadequate presentation of facts now relied on by the petitioner or the
court made an apparently unsupported conclusion.6 7 Under Noia and
Sain it appears that the issues of unreasonable search and seizure in White
and systematic exclusion in Parker will be sufficient to obtain a writ of
habeas corpus. In fact, in White the court pointed out that the petitioners
"may yet, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, pursue their claim"6 s
but said that it did not think North Carolina should disrupt the administration of justice "by changing the orderly procedures established by the
legislature to review a convicted defendant's claims that his constitutional
rights have been violated,"6 since it was convinced the North Carolina
The court
laws "fully meet the requirements of due process . . ... ,
further noted that any change it "might make in our procedure in an

effort to satisfy the federal courts would not necessarily accomplish that
681Id.
041 d.
6%td.

at 399.

60372 U.S. 293 (1963).

In Sain, the Supreme Court held that
a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under
the following circumstances: If, (1) the merits of the factual dispute were
not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5)
the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing;
or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
372 U.S. at 313. 229, 162 S.E.2d at 478.
- 274 N.C. at
00 Id. at 230, 162 S.E.2d at 479.

10Id.
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purpose"' because of "the present instability of longstanding decisions and
the diversity in views of the different federal district court judges ....,,72

Because of the procedural doctrines of waiver and finality of state
lower court judgments, the courts seem willing to abdicate responsibility
in the post conviction hearing for extending petitioners their constitutional
rights, even though they clearly recognize that the federal courts will step
in to fill this void. Not only does this seem undesirable from the standpoint of promptness, but it also makes the proceedings under the Act
wasteful.

Evidence
COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES

In State v. Porter,' the North Carolina Supreme Court, construing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57,2 held that testimony by the defendant's wife that
her husband had assaulted her sister was not competent. The court stated
that since the evidence was forbidden by statute, the failure of the defendant to object in apt time did not amount to a waiver of objection.
According to the court, it was the duty of the trial judge to exclude the
testimony.
This same statute was under scrutiny in State v. Alford," where the
court held that evidence solicited from the former wife of the defendant
7

1Id.

72Id.

'272 N.C. 463, 158 S.E.2d 626 (1968).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (1967) reads:
The husband or wife of the defendant, in all criminal actions or proceedings,
shall be a competent witness for the defendant, but the failure of the witness
to be examined shall not be used to the prejudice of the defense. Every such
person examined shall be subject to be cross-examined as are other witnesses.
No husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage. Nothing herein
shall render any spouse competent or compellable to give evidence against
the other spouse in any criminal action or proceeding, except to prove the
fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annulment in cases of bigamy and in cases of criminal cohabitation in violation
of the provisions of G.S. 14-183, and except that in all criminal prosecutions
of a spouse for an assault upon the other spouse, or for any criminal offense
against a legitimate or illegitimate or adopted or foster minor child of either
spouse, or for abandonment or for neglecting to provide for the spouse's support, or for the support of the children of such spouse, it shall be lawful to
examine a spouse in behalf of the State against the other spouse: Provided
that this section shall not affect pending litigation relating to a criminal
offense against a minor child.
8
274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968).
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in a manslaughter case was admissible at the second trial, an absolute
divorce having been awarded between the first and second trials. Although
earlier North Carolina cases4 have held to the contrary with respect to
a divorced spouse's competency, both Porter and Alford are consistent
with the policy underlying the statute, which is to protect family harmony
and the intimate relationship of marriage.5 The court in Alford, however,
limited the decision to felony cases, so at this juncture the divorced spouse
may still be incompetent to testify in misdemeanor cases. 6 It would seem
logical, however, that the Alford rule will be extended to make the divorced spouse competent to testify against the other in both types of cases.
Even if Alford were so extended, it is arguable that the earlier cases
that established the incompetency of the divorced spouse to testify in
misdemeanor cases 7 might be distinguished and maintained. Both of these
cases found specifically that the divorced spouse was incompetent to testify
as to the other's adultery that occurred during the marriage. The rationale
behind removing the incompetency following a divorce applies with equal
force to adultery cases, however, and any recognition of incompetency
to testify in this isolated instance should not survive.
BREATHALYZER EVIDENCE

Two recent decisions, State v. Mobley' and State v. McCabe,9 deal
with the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2,"' and the use of the
'State v. Raby, 121 N.C. 682, 28 S.E. 490 (1897) ; State v. Jones., 89 N.C. 559

(1883).

'The weight of authority is in accord with the North Carolina holding that a

divorced spouse should be competent to testify against her husband. See Annot., 38

A.L.R.2d 570, 579-80 (1954) ; 58 Am. JUl. Witnesses § 204 (1948). That divorce
terminates the incompetency seems only reasonable since the divorce itself has already destroyed the family harmony and the marriage relationship which the statute

seeks to protect.

' It should be noted that the Alford case merely removes the incompetency of the

divorced spouse. The privilege protecting confidential communications between the

husband and wife continues even after divorce, for this privilege is clearly covered
by the statute.
' Cases cited note 4 supra.
'273 N.C. 471, 160 S.E.2d 334 (1968).
' 1 N.C. App. 237, 161 S.E.2d 42 (1968).
oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1965)provides:
(a) Any person who operates a vehicle upon the public highways of the state
shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his breath for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood for any
offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. The test or tests shall be administered upon request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to have
been driving a motor vehicle upon public highways of the State while
under the influence of intoxicating liquors.
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results of a breathalyzer test as evidence. In Mobley the defendant was
taken to the police station following his arrest. He was told that he did
not have to take the breathalyzer test and that he had a right to refuse
to take it, but that his refusal could be used as an "assumption of guilt
in court."'" Ruling that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, the
North Carolina Supreme Court held that the officer administering the
test did not qualify as an expert' 2 and that the unqualified statement of
the officer, that if the defendant did not take the test it would be used as an
assumption against him in court, coerced him to take the test and "weighed
13
the scales too heavily against the defendant.'
14
In McCabe an officer gave the defendant the Miranda v. AriZona
warnings only after he had taken the test. The breathalyzer test showed
.20 per cent alcohol in the defendant's blood, and this result was admitted
into evidence. The court of appeals held that the test may be given to the
defendant without first advising him of his right to refuse to take it,
and that the results therefrom could be used against the defendant because
by operating his vehicle on the state's highways, he had under the statute
impliedly consented to the test.
In light of these two decisions, the meaning of the statutory language
is open to some question. It seems inconsistent in some cases to allow
the defendant to refuse to take the test, but in others to hold that he does
(b) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test under the
provisions of G.S. 20-16.2, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any
criminal action growing out of an alleged violation of driving a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this State . . while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Provided: That before evidence of refusal
shall be admissible in evidence in any such criminal action the court,
upon motion duly made in apt time by the defendant, shall make due inquiry in the absence of the jury as to the character of the alleged refusal
and the circumstances under which the alleged refusal occurred; and
both the State and the accused shall be entitled to offer evidence upon the
question of whether or not the accused actually refused to submit to the
chemical test provided in G.S. 20-139.1.
For a discussion of some of the practical and legal problems involved in this type
legislation, see Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication,45 N.C.L. REv. 34 (1966).
11273 N.C. at 474, 160 S.E.2d at 337.
12 The evidence showed that the officer had administered the test for two years
and that he had graduated from the Department of Community College, but there
was nothing to show what he had studied at the community college or that he had
had a course of instruction on making breathalyzer tests and was qualified to give
tests for alcoholic content in human blood or to testify to the results. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-139.1 (1965). For a case where the qualifications are discussed and
approved by the court, see State v. Powell, 264 N.C. 73, 140 S.E.2d 705 (1965).
138273 N.C. at 475, 160 S.E.2d at 337. It should be noted that, under the terms
of the statute, refusal to take the test might in some cases be admitted into evidence
against the defendant. See note 10 supra.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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not need to be told of his right to do so, especially as the statute itself
makes elaborate provisions for determining the nature of the refusal
before it is admissible against the defendant. It is arguable that this
statutory language implicitly recognizes the right to refuse. The fact
that coercion was found in Mobley even though the defendant had not
actually refused to take the test"6 bolsters this interpretation, and further
indicates that the defendant must not be goaded by misinformation into
foregoing this right. The question then becomes whether the state has
the affirmative burden of informing the defendant of his right to refuse
to submit to the breathalyzer. The implied consent portion of the statute,16
and the use in McCabe of this language in upholding the delayed Miranda
warnings, would seem to indicate no such burden. Definitive resolution
of this problem must await adjudication before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
HEARSAY

Wilson v. Hartford Accident and Idemnity Co. 1 7 raised the problem
of admissibility of a conversation when the person testifying has heard
only part of the exchange. The plaintiff, seeking to establish that there
was only a limited permission to use a car, contended that it was error
for the trial court to sustain the defendant's objections to questions addressed to plaintiff's witness concerning a conversation that she had overheard between the owner of the car (the plaintiff insured) and the driver
of the car at the time of the accident. The court held that since the witness by her own admission had not heard the entire conversation, there
was no error in refusing to allow the witness to testify that she did not
hear the owner impose a time limitation upon the use of the car.
The holding is consistent with prior North Carolina law that "a
witness cannot be allowed to testify to the non-existence of a fact, where
his situation with respect to the matter is such that the fact might well
have existed without his being aware of it."" It would seem, however,
that there is some point at which such testimony would be relevant to
the question of whether the statement was ever made. For example, having testimony that something was not said during most of a conversation
273 N.C. at 475, 160 S.E.2d at 337.
10

N.C.

For a discussion of the constitutional questions arising under a statute such as
GEN. STAT.

§ 20-16.2 (1965), see Comment, Chemnicat Tests and Implied Con-

sent, 42 N.C.L. REv. 841 (1964).

' 272 N.C. 183, 158 S.E.2d 1 (1967).
Accord, Vann v.
18 Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N.C. 629, 55 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
Hayes, 266 N.C. 713, 147 S.E.2d 186 (1966).
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certainly increases the odds that the thing may never have been said, and
the testimony is arguably sufficiently relevant for the jury to consider.'0
It could be left to the cross examiner to reveal the weakness of such
testimony and to the jury to assign to it the proper weight.2 °
The court in Wilson. quite properly held that the hearsay rule was
inapplicable since the witness was not testifying as to the truth of the
statement, but merely as to the fact that the statement was made.2 '
In Koury v. Folo2 2 the court held that a label on a medicine bottle
and a medical text were not hearsay. The case involved a malpractice
suit in which the plaintiff alleged that the physician negligently prescribed
overdoses of Strep-Combiotic for a nine month old child and that his
negligence caused the child to become deaf. Plaintiff introduced a manufacturer's label on the drug vial that said in bold, red letters, "NOT FOR
PEDIATRIC USE." Passages from a textbook of pediatrics containing
statements as to the proper dosage of the drug for children were also
read into evidence by plaintiff's expert witness.' At the close of plaintiff's
evidence, judgment of nonsuit was entered upon the defendant's motion,
and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal the defendant contended that the
trial court erred in permitting this evidence, but the court held that this
argument was unavailing and discussed the competency of the evidenceeven though the question was not before the court.
Citing Wilson and using the same reasoning applied there to distinguish between hearsay and non-hearsay, the court held that the label and
the text were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter contained
therein, but to show that a warning had been given.25 As stated in the
opinion:
" This type of consideration is not new to evidence law. Opinion as to automobile speed, for example, is often allowed as relevant to the issue of speed at the time
of a collision, although the witness's impressions may have been gleaned some distance before the point of impact. E.g., Adkins v. Dills, 260 N.C. 206, 132 S.E.2d
324 (1963).
202 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 659 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORI].
21
D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 141 (2d ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].
22272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
The defendant physician had specifically referred to the text during cross exanination as one in his office that contained information as to proper dosages of
streptomycin, and the text had been introduced as plaintiff's exhibit number 4.
Record at 121, 125.
24 The court said that the defendant's argument was unavailing because, on a
motion for nonsuit, all plaintiff's evidence, even that erroneously admitted, must be
given full probative force, and because the defendant had not objected to the introduction of these documents themselves but only to the questions to witnesses concerning their contents. 272 N.C. at 375, 158 S.E.2d at 553.
Id. at 376, 158 S.E.2d at 554.
25
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It is evidence of a warning which the physician disregards at his peril,
and his disregard of it is relevant upon the issue of his use of reasonable
care, where other evidence shows the drug is, in fact, dangerous to a
child.26
Potts v. Howser 7 involved a claim for personal injuries incurred in
a boating accident. At the trial, plaintiff was cross examined as to an
automobile accident subsequent to the boating accident. Following the
auto accident plaintiff had authorized a Dr. Floyd to render a medical
report, and over objection plaintiff was cross examined as to this report.
Specifically, plaintiff was asked if the report didn't contain certain statements, which were read aloud by the defendant's attorney. The medical
report itself was never introduced, and Dr. Floyd was not in court and
did not testify. The supreme court held the medical report was hearsay
because:
Defendant's cross-examination of plaintiff concerning Dr. Floyd's medical report was for the purpose of showing that plaintiff had been injured and disabled in the Wilmington accident and could not claim
damages against defendant for that period of disability. Defendant was
not merely seeking to establish the fact that Dr. Floyd rendered a medical report. Rather, he was seeking to establish the truth of what the
report said, and was placing its contents before the jury without introcould not do directly. The
ducing it. He was doing indirectly what he
28
medical report itself was clearly hearsay.
It does not appear that defendant's attorney ever did more than ask plaintiff if the report actually contained the information that was read. Had
the plaintiff been asked whether he agreed with the statements in the reports, its hearsay character would not have been fatal. Rather, this would
have constituted an admission by the plaintiff and would have qualified
as an exception to the hearsay rule.2 9 Nevertheless, a mere acknowledgement of the contents of the report, without more, seems clearly to justify
the court's ruling of hearsay.
Plaintiff's attorney further excepted to the cross examination of plaintiff concerning complaints to his fifth wife about tenseness in his wrists.
The court held that this was harmless since merely referring to his wife
Id.
21274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
29 Id. at 57, 161 S.E.2d at 743.
-,

". "An admission is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of the exis-

tence or truth of certain facts which are inconsistent with his claim in an action
and amount therefore to proof against him." 29 Am. JUR. 2D Evidence § 597
See generally STANSBURY § 167.
(1967).
20274 N.C. 49, 59, 161 S.E.2d 737, 745 (1968).
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would not identify her properly in that plaintiff had had numerous wives.
This reasoning would seem to be faulty at best. The significant fact is
that the plaintiff at some time in the past complained to someone of what
was then present pain and suffering in his wrists. Identifying the person
as his wife would be sufficient. He had only one wife at a time. Injecting
the additional fact that the individual was his fifth wife contributes nothing relevant to the identification.
The question might be asked whether the court's ruling that to inquire
about the plaintiff's Mexican divorce and the inaccuracy of his income
tax returns was "merely to prejudice him in the eyes of the jury without
ratonal basis as affecting his credibility"-" is in keeping with the broad
spectrum of misconduct which North Carolina has permitted in the past
32
to impeach a party's testimony.
IMPEACHMENT

Alford,"3

In State v.
the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to
allow as impeaching evidence at a second trial the use of a guilty plea
that had been adjudicated "unknowing" at an earlier post-conviction hearing."4 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Arsenault v. Massachusetts,35 held that the defendant's guilty plea entered at a preliminary hearing when he was not represented by counsel could not be introduced as evidence at the trial even to refresh defendant's memory on
cross examination.
Thus the North Carolina court seems to be in line with the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions that held that if the defendant's
guilty plea is in any way tainted by involuntariness, it will not be admissible for any purpose. 6 The Alford case further illustrates that in
" Id., quoting Foxman v. Hanes, 218 N.C. 722, 725, 12 S.E.2d 258, 260 (1940).

" See STANSBURY § 111.

"274 N.C. 125, 161 S.E.2d 575 (1968).
" North Carolina does, however, permit the admission into evidence of a guilty

plea from a previous trial at a trial de izovo, but then there is no problem of the
voluntariness of the plea. See State v. Ingram, 204 N.C. 557, 168 S.E. 837 (1933).
Some writers have even criticized the use of the plea in the trial de novo, suggesting
that no use of the previous plea of guilty should be permitted. See C. McCoRMIciC,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 242, at 310, 311 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].

Actually, the policy of protecting the defendant from impeachment by his own
involuntary admissions is very old. In 1882, the court reversed a conviction when
the defendant's admissions at a preliminary hearing were used to impeach his own
testimony at trial. The admissions were involuntary because the defendant had not
been warned of his right to remain silent. State v. Spier, 86 N.C. 600 (1882). See
also State v. Bohanon, 142 N.C. 694, 55 S.E. 797 (1906).
- U.S. - (1968). See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 1050 (1963).
"Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966). For further discussion
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criminal actions the court is more prone to precaution in admitting statements amounting to admissions than in civil actions. Clearly had this
been a civil suit in which the defendant had amended his pleadings to
deny an allegation admitted in the original answer, the original 3answer
7
would have been admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes.
JUROR

NOTE

TAKING & CONDUCT

In State v. Shedd,"' the North Carolina Supreme Court strongly implied that a juror may take notes during a criminal trial without prejudicing the rights of the defendant; at least the trial judge does not abuse
his discretion if he refuses to inquire into the note taking if defense
counsel does not register a prompt objection. In affirming the conviction
of two appellants convicted upon three indictments growing out of an
attempted burglary, the court also reaffirmed a venerable line of North
Carolina cases holding that the trial judge has complete discretion to declare or not to declare a mistrial of possible misconduct of jurors and
witnesses.
39
The court's implied approval of general note taking by jurors seems
4
to go further than State v. Goldberg" and Cowles v. Hayes, ' which approved the use of notes by jurors for specific purposes. In Goldberg, the
jury wrote down the indictments and counts of a complex criminal case
at the request of the trial judge. Cowles involved a civil suit in which
the trial judge permitted jurors to copy an item of evidence--a list of
articles sold-that the plaintiff had introduced. Though it did not squarely settle the issue of the propriety of jurors taking notes on evidence
and testimony, the court with Shedd can probably be said to have placed
itself in the majority, if indeed it was not there before.
Among other assigned errors, appellants alleged that the trial judge
also abused his discretion in not conducting an investigation into the possibility of declaring a mistrial-or at least giving special admonishment
to the jury-after it was brought to his attention that one of the witnesses
against the defendants discussed the case with other witnesses outside

of North Carolina's position on the use of evidence obtained in criminal prosecution
in relation to Miranda,see pp. 482-84 supra; Pollitt & Strong, ConstitutionalLaw,
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 855 (1967).
See generally STANSBuRY § 177.

's274 N.C. 95, 161 S.E.2d 477 (1968).
"The court said, "Most authorities in this Nation take the view that the making and use of trial notes by the jury is not misconduct but is proper, and may even
be desirable. . .

."

Id. at 104, 161 S.E.2d at 484.

"261 N.C. 181, 134, S.E.2d 334, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
"71 N.C. 230 (1874).
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the courtroom within hearing of the jurors. There was no showing as to
what was said, and the defense counsel did not ask for an investigation.
Relying on a line of cases dating back to 1850,42 the supreme court ruled
that the trial judge had complete discretion to declare or not to declare
a mistrial when there was merely possible but not proven misconduct by
jurors or witnesses. To obtain a reversal based upon abuse of discretion,
the defense would have had to carry the burden of showing that the alleged error was prejudicial in the sense that it amounted to a denial of
some substantial right.
JURY VIEW

In Toiler v. Brink's, Inc., an action for personal injuries arising
out of an automobile collision, the jury was permitted to go to the scene
of the accident, which had occurred some four years prior to trial. The
judge's charge to the jury treated the evidence obtained therefrom as
substantive evidence. 5 On appeal, the court held the instruction erroneous, reasoning that the purpose of the jury view was "merely to present
the scene to the jury more vividly than is possible by the description of
the witnesses.""
Since North Carolina has no general statute permitting jury view, 47 the
court's ruling that the jury view was in the discretion of the trial judge
and was to be used only for illustrative evidence was in accord with prior
decisions." It is questionable, however, whether the North Carolina approach to the jury view is realistic. The task of a jury disassociating
what they have seen from what they have heard in the courtroom is difficult and the likelihood of success highly improbable.40 Perhaps it would
42 Stone v. Griffin Baking Co., 257 N.C. 103, 125 S.E.2d 363 (1962); Keener v.
Beal, 246 N.C. 247, 98 S.E.2d 19 (1957) ; Lewis v. Fountain, 168 N.C. 277, 84 S.E.

278 (1915); Baker v. Brown, 151 N.C. 12, 65 S.E. 520 (1909); Pharr v. Atlanta

& C. Air Line Ry., 132 N.C. 418, 44 S.E. 37 (1903); Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C.
471 (1874); State v. Tilghman, 33 N.C. 513 (1850).
j 274 N.C. at 104, 161 S.E.2d at 483.
"1 N.C. App. 315, 161 S.E.2d 208 (1968).
' The judge charged: "You should weigh all the evidence in every way, the
oral evidence, the physical evidence, and the evidence that you obtained by viewing
thepremises." Id. at 317, 161 S.E.2d at 210.
47

Id.

STANssurw § 120. North Carolina does, however, under N.C. GE N. STAT. §
1-181.1 (Supp. 1967), expressly authorize a jury view, in the judge's discretion, in
eminent domain and condemnation cases.
,' See Paris v. Carolina Portable Aggregates, Inc., 271 N.C. 471, 157 S.E.2d
131 (1967) ; State v. Lawrence, 196 N.C. 562, 146 S.E. 395 (1925) ; State v. Stuart,
189 N.C. 340, 127 S.E. 260 (1925).
"'As McCormick states:
The impression on the senses of the jury or judge from a view of a building,
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be more plausible for the court to adopt the conclusion of a number of
other courts that the "knowledge derived from a view is evidence which
the jury may use as a basis for finding the facts so disclosed." 50
OPINION EVIDENCE

Expert Testimony
In Inman v. Harper,5 a suit arising out of an automobile-truck
collision, one basis of the defendant's appeal was the admission of
testimony by the plaintiff's physician as to the plaintiff's medical history.
In answer to the question, "And what was the medical history you obtained?" the physician answered: "Mrs. Inman stated that six months
prior to this she had been in an automobile accident. She was treated by
Dr. Levin, since deceased, at Ocean Drive Beach, South Carolina. ' 52 In
53
allowing this testimony, the court seemed to emphasize the continuity
of treatment rather than the purpose for which the information was obtained. Although the opinion does not discuss whether the evidence was
admitted to show the basis of the physician's opinion or as substantive
evidence, the record indicates that the admission was for substantive
purposes.5"
To support its position the court cited Moore v. Summers Drug Co.,5 5
in which the court allowed as substantive evidence the admission of the
patient's statements concerning his past pain and suffering when suba dam, or a wrecked automobile, is information of the most direct and convincing kind about relevant facts ....

It runs counter to common sense...

to suppose that jurors, no matter how they may be instructed, will disregard
the evidence of their own senses as to the location of a building or dam...
when it comes in conflict with contrary testimony of all the witnesses.
MCCORMICK § 183.
" Id. See also 4 WIGMORE § 1168.
"12 N.C. App. 103, 162 S.E.2d 629 (1968).
2 Record

at 95.

" The court stated:
Plaintiff's evidence showed a connected medical treatment. Although the
doctors first treated plaintiff several months after the accident, the evidence
was that she had not been released from medical or psychiatric care since the
accident and -went to these doctors by referral from another doctor. Both
testified to the history given them by plaintiff, and this was properly admissible.
2 N.C. App. at 108, 162 S.E.2d at 632.
' Since a complete transcript of the trial was not included in the record on
appeal, it is difficult to ascertain exactly the purpose of this evidence about the
accident. It should be noted also that the defendants objected to the entire depositions of the physicians because the treatment was remote. The court seems to
have considered all the evidence of the doctors as a whole, including testimony as
to both past pain and suffering and as to the automobile accident itself, without
distinguishing either the types or the use of this information.
206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96 (1934).
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mitted by the treating physician. Many courts have recognized this type
of testimony as an exception to the hearsay rule. 0 When the physician
is testifying as to the patient's statements of the cause of the injury,
however, the evidence is held by most courts to be inadmissible as proof
of the causal event.57 Inman should be compared with Todd v. Watts,"0
where the court held that the physician's testimony" as to his opinion
of the patient's injuries was inadmissible because it was based partially on
the patient's own statements concerning the accident and the injuries
resulting therefrom. The distinction to be recognized here is that in
Todd the statements of the patient were sought to be used only as basis
for the treating physician's opinion, whereas in Inan the patient's statements were apparently being used as substantive evidence that an accident had occurred.
Whether Inman foreshadows a change in the North Carolina court's
position regarding the admissibility of medical history evidence when offered by the treating physician is uncertain. It is fair to say, however,
that if the evidence in the principal case was offered not as substantive
evidence, but to show the basis of the physician's opinion, then the decision indicates that the pendulum is swinging back to Penland v. Bird Coal
Co.,60 relied on by the dissent in Todd, and the vitality of the Todd decision has been short-lived. However, if the evidence was admitted to
prove that the accident occurred, it is arguable that the evidence was
hearsay, and if the case is followed it will represent an extension of
Moore and a newly recognized exception to the hearsay rule in North
Carolina.
In Potts v. Howser,6 ' plaintiff argued that it was error for the defendant to cross examine plaintiff's medical expert witness as to certain
radiologist's reports. The supreme court found no error, ruling that
" See Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physiciaes Opinion Based on Patien's Statements, 46 N.C.L. REv. 960, 962 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note,

Physician's Opinion].
57 Id. at 962 & n.15.
" 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967), noted in Note, Physician's Opinion.
5
The doctor in Todd testified as to his diagnosis, and in so doing referred to
the accident and the injuries; as to his opinion that lumbo-sacral strain and persistent headaches could have resulted from the accident; and as to the possibility
that a congenital spine defect could have been aggravated by the accident. 269 N.C.
at 419-20, 152 S.E.2d at 250-51.
246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957). In Penland the court held the physician
could testify as to the statements made to him by the patient to show the basis for
his opinion, but not as substantive evidence.
01274 N.C. 49, 161 S.E.2d 737 (1968).
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the doctor was not reading the report but rather expressing his own
opinion as to what the report said after he had examined it.
A doctor may in some cases be able to testify as to statements made
to him by the plaintiff to show the grounds upon which he is basing an
opinion,12 but statements made by the plaintiff to a non-treating physician
or by a third party to a treating physician normally may not be used for
this purpose." In Sewall v. Brame, 4 the supreme court seemed to preclude opinion testimony by an expert who based his opinion on facts
related to him by another expert. Since Ingram v. McCuiston0 5 however,
it seems that a medical expert may be able to base his opinion on the
opinion of another expert, if that opinion is in evidence and has been
properly incorporated into a hypothetical question as assumed fact. 0 In
Potts, however, it does not appear that either the X-rays (the factual
basis for the radiologist's report) or the report itself (representing
opinion of another expert based on the X-rays) had been introduced.
Assuming the correctness of the court's assertion that the doctor was
only expressing an opinion as to what the report said, it would seem that
the testimony was still faulty as having been grounded on matter not
7
properly before the jury.1
Jury Province Rule
Hendricks v. Hendricks8 points up the tedious, superficial distinctions involved in determining whether a witness's opinion as to a person's mental capacity to make a will or to execute a deed invades the
province of the jury. Having previously ruled as inadmissible the testimony of various plaintiff's witnesses to the effect that the grantor did
not have "sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of making a deed, its scope and effect, and to know what land
he was disposing of and to whom and how," the North Carolina Supreme Court, on rehearing, reversed its previous decision and held that
STANSBURY § 136; Note, Physician's Opinion 961-63.
"STANSBURY § 136.
o'258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963).
o 261 N.C. 392, 134 S.E.2d 705 (1964).
"STANSBURY
§ 136, at 329 n.44 (Supp. 1968).
o'It is arguable that the effect of the court's ruling is to bring North Carolina
in line with the minority of courts that allow a medical expert to base his opinion
on information received from third persons in the medical profession. See Comment, Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony Based in Part Upon Information
Received From Third Persons, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 193, 194 (1962). However desirable such a rule might be, it is nevertheless doubtful that the court intended to
go so
far.N.C. 733, 161
"273
S.E.2d 97 (1968).
"Id. at 734, 161 S.E.2d at 98.
"See
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such evidence was admissible. The basis of the first opinion, which cited
7 ° was that the question permitted the witness to
McDevitt v. Chandler,
testify as to the ultimate issue in the case.
In retracting its previous statement and holding that the lay witness
could, based on his own observation, give his opinion as to the grantor's
mental condition, the court adhered to prior case law that has recognized
an exception to the jury province rule where the question is one of mental
capacity." The distinction that the court draws between McDevitt and
Hendricks may be of questionable validity, however. Based on the notion
that the witness is assuming a knowledge of legal standards when he
testifies that X did not have the mental capacity to make a will or to execute a deed,7 2 courts will find error in the queston, "Is it your opinion
on that day she did not have sufficient capacity to make a deed," 7 but
will permit testimony that X did not have "sufficient mental capacity to
Since
understand the nature and consequences of making a deed... ."I
the average juror would probably interpret both of these statements as
meaning "he didn't know what he was doing," under Hendricks verbosity
seems to be the key to admissibility.
Weight and Credibility v. Admissibility
The general rule is that a "lay witness may give his opinion as to the
identity of a person whom he has seen, and his lack of positiveness affects
only the weight, but not the admissibility, of his testimony." 5 In State
v. Clyburn,76 however, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
equivocal testimony7" of a witness as to the identity of the accused was
,o241 N.C. 677, 86 S.E.2d 438 (1955).
STAxsBubY §§ 126, 127. See, e.g., Hammond v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 570, 148
S.E.2d 523 (1968); Bissett v. Bailey, 176 N.C. 43, 96 S.E. 648 (1918).
' STANSBURY § 127.
"McDevitt v. Chandler, 241 N.C. 677, 680, 86 S.E.2d 438, 440 (1955).
" Hendricks v. Hendricks, 273 N.C. 733, 734, 161 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1968). Wigmore suggests that a witness's opinion evidence should not be excluded at all on
the premise that it goes to the ultimate issue. 7 WIGMORE §§ 1920, 1921. This
position is also proposed by Rule 56(4) of the UNIFORm RULEs or EVIDENCE. See
also Note, 16 N.C.L. REv. 180 (1938).
" STANsBURY § 129.
" 273 N.C. 284, 159 S.E.2d 868 (1968).
" The witness testified in part:
As far as I remember Fryer and McVay are the two men, I believe ....

It

is just hard to say for sure this is what I saw three months ago. I can't

honestly say that they are the two men, but I believe they were. There is

some doubt in my mind about it, but I believe they are the two men.

Id. at 288, 159 S.E.2d at 871. Compare this testimony with that in State v. Bridges,

266 N.C. 354, 146 S.E.2d 107 (1966), where the witness testified "I think" defendant is the man, id. at 355, 146 S.E.2d at 108, and with the testimony in State
v. Hanes, 268 N.C. 335, 150 S.E.2d 489 (1966).
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insufficient" to send the case to the jury. This testimony was the only
evidence admitted against the defendant, and the court ruled that the
trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for nonsuit because,
[i]t would be incongruous to submit the question of identity of the defendant to the jury for their determination beyond a reasonable doubt
upon the testimony of a witness who could "not honestly say that they
79
were the two men."1
Compare the court's reasoning in the instant case with other situations
both criminal and civil where the sole witness to a material fact admitted
uncertainty and used the term "I guess" or "I think." In State v. Clayton8 0
the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter in a hit-andrun accident. The only evidence as to the speed the vehicle was traveling
immediately before the accident was the testimony of a school bus driver
that he had observed the vehicle for some 200 to 300 feet and that it was
traveling 60 to 70 M.P.H. in a 55 M.P.H. zone. On cross examination,
however, the witness stated: "It is true that I am guessing at all these
speeds and distances." '
The court here did not even consider the sufficiency of the evidence
to take the case to the jury, but merely relied on the general rule that a
person with reasonable opportunity to observe is competent to testify as to
the fact observed. 2 The court said that the use of the word "guess" in3
dicated that the testimony was an opinion based on observable fact.
Where there has been reasonable opportunity to observe, but the
quality of the observation is open to question, should the nature of the
fact observed make the evidence any less sufficient to convict a person of
theft than of involuntary manslaughter?
" The court stated: "Here the court is not concerned with whether the evidence
is competent, but the question is whether it is sufficient to carry the case to the

jury." 273 N.C. at 291, 159 S.E.2d at 873. The court later indicated that such

evidence would amount merely to a suspicion or conjecture as to the defendant's
identity. Id. at 292, 159 S.E.2d at 874.
'OId. at 292, 159 S.E.2d at 874. Compare this holding with that in State v.
Bridges, 266 N.C. 354, 146 S.E.2d 107 (1966). See, Brandis, Evidence, Survey
of North Carolina Case Law, 44 N.C.L. REv. 1005, 1007 (1966).
80272 N.C. 377, 158 S.E.2d 557 (1968).
81
Id. at 382, 158 S.E.2d at 560.
82 See McCoRmICK § 10; STANSSBURY § 131.
272 N.C. at 382-83, 158 S.E.2d at 561. The court cited several cases from
other jurisdictions explaining that the word "guess" does not necessarily mean
speculation or conjecture, but rather it is the expression of opinion concerning facts
of which he has knowledge, but is not certain that he is absolutely accurate. Id.
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PRIVILEGE

Attorney-Client Privilege
In line with prior holdings, 4 the court in State v. White8" held that
the attorney-client privilege is waived when the client testifies as to communications otherwise deemed privileged and that the attorney is free
to testify as to these same communications, especially where the client's
version reflects upon the attorney.
Physician-PatientPrivilege
In Neese v. Neese,88 the plaintiff brought the action to rescind the
sale of forty-one shares of stock to his nephew on the grounds that he
lacked the mental capacity to make the transfer at the time of the transaction. The court issued a temporary restraining order, and at the hearing on the restraining order, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of his doctor.8 7 Subsequently, defendant gave notice and attempted to take the
deposition of plaintiff's physician, but the plaintiff objected to certain
questions and claimed the physician-patient privilege. 8s Defendant applied to the judge of the superior court for an order requiriig the physician to answer the questions. From a denial of this motion the defendant appealed, claiming that the plaintiff had waived the privilege by
filing the complaint asserting his mental condition and by introducing
into evidence the affidavit of the physician at the hearing. The appellate
court, however, while recognizing that the privilege may be either expressly or impliedly waived,"9 held that neither the complaint nor the
8
See generally, STANsBuRY § 62.
1 N.C. App. 219, 161 S.E.2d 32 (1968).
1 N.C. App. 426, 161 S.E.2d 841 (1968).
"'The pertinent part of the affidavit was as follows:
I have seen Mr. Neese intermittently from May of 1965 through the present
time. I have studied his history and personal interviews. I have also examined the affidavits from a number of people closely associated with Mr.
Neese, both in personal life and in business, regarding his behavior prior to
and during the time of the stock transaction. It is my conclusion that Mr.
Neese was not competent to handle the transfer of the stock at the time.
Id. at 427, 161 S.E.2d at 841.
" N.C. Gx. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) provides:

No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be required
to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to
enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any for him
as a surgeon: Provided that the presiding judge of a superior court may
compel such disclosure, if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper
administration of justice.
"Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960); Creech v. Soverign
Camp, W.O.W., 211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937); Smith v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 60 S.E. 717 (1908) ; Fuller v. Knights of Pythias, 129 N.C.
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affidavits amounted to a waiver of privilege. Citing Gustafson v. Gustafson,"° a case in which the plaintiff in a divorce action had used the
affidavits of her physician to sustain her position that she had sufficiently
recovered from her disability to have custody of the child, the court
based its decision on the temporary nature of the hearing and emphasized
the failure of the defendant to object to the use of the affidavits at the
hearing or to request an examination of the physician at that time.
Both of these cases point up the possible need for revision of the
physician-patient privilege statute in North Carolina. Compared with
other states,9" North Carolina has been rather liberal in granting the
privilege, but to allow the patient both the protection from exposure of
his physical condition and the benefit of such evidence when his bodily or
mental condition is a material element in his cause of action seem inherently unfair. Interestingly enough, other states having statutes similar to North Carolina's-which permits the privilege even after suit is
filed-have held that using the physician's evidence waives the privilege. 9
Another issue raised in Gustafson, but not considered in Neese, is the
need for the superior court judge to be presiding at a term of court in
order to come within the proviso of the statute that allows such a judge
in his discretion to compel disclosure if necessary to meet the ends of
justice. This holding that a superior court judge cannot compel disclosure
when he is only sitting at a hearing in his chambers is in accord with
prior North Carolina law." However, in light of the new rules of civil
318, 40 S.E. 65 (1901). The court in Neese, however, found no waiver because the
plaintiff had not called the physician as a witness, had not testified as to his mental
condition, and had not alleged any communication with the physician or any specific
treatment given the plaintiff by the physician.
272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d 619 (1968), wted in 46 N.C.L. REv. 956 (1968).
91
In many states the physician-patient privilege is inapplicable after a suit putting physical or mental condition in issue has been filed. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANix. § 90.242(3) (Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(4) (c) (Supp. 1967) ; ILL.
ANir. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1966).
" Albritton v. Ferguson, 197 Ark. 436, 122 S.W.2d 620 (1938) ; Soden v. Gemberling, 188 Kan. 716, 366 P.2d 235 (1961); Penniston v. Provident Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., - La. -, 154 So. 2d 617 (1963); Maas v. Laursen, 219 Minn. 461, 18
N.W.2d 233 (1945) ; City of Laurel v. Upton, 253 Miss. 380, 175 So. 2d 621 (1965) ;
State v. Burchett, 302 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1957); Hier v. Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P.2d 831 (1937); People v. Runion, 3 N.Y.2d 637, 148
N.E.2d 165 (1958). Hagerstein v. Milwaukee Mon. Co., 169 Wisc. 502, 173 N.W.
215 (1919).
'See Johnston v. United Ins. Co., 262 N.C. 253, 136 S.E.2d 587 (1964) ; Lockwood v. McCaskill, 261 N.C. 754, 136 S.E.2d 67 (1964). Both these decisions
indicate that the judge must not only be sitting at a term of court, but must also
be the judge who will be sitting at the trial of the case. Since in North Carolina the
superior court judges rotate within the district and thus there may be a substantial
period of time between the pre-trial hearing and the trial, knowing which judge will
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procedure which liberalize pre-trial discovery, this aspect of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53 would seem to be fertile ground for legislative action.
Moreover, the question raised by the dissent of whether a superior court
judge when conducting a custody hearing either at term or in chambers
is a presiding judge within the scope of the statute is also possibly worthy
of statutory delineation.
This portion of the statute was further considered in the per curiam
opinion in State v. Howard,14 where the defendant was charged with
manslaughter and the state introduced evidence from the defendant's
family physician who had treated the defendant for injuries sustained in
the accident. The doctor had testified that in his opinion the defendant
was under the influence of alcohol. The court held that the admission of
this evidence was not error since the record showed that it was necessary
for a proper administration of justice. The question might be asked,
however, whether this evidence was covered by the physician-patient
privilege at all.
be sitting on the bench is virtually impossible. The burden of this requirement becomes onerous indeed because of the delay, and prejudice inherent in such a delay.
9' 272 N.C. 519, 158 S.E.2d 350 (1968).

